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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper is concerned with dynamic programs in which the horizon length 
,V is long and$nz’t~ As stressed by Hinderer [I I] and Hinderer-Hiibner [12], 
it is important to distinguish between infinite horizons and long finite horizons, 
since, contrary to popular belief, optimal solutions to the former do not always 
lead to useful approximate solutions to the latter. That phenomenon is primarily 
due to the “weakness” of the usual infinite horizon criteria (see (l), (2), (3.) and 
(4) below), which can be particularly critical when the state space is infinite. 
A counterexample illustrating that appears at the end of this section. In Sections 
2, 3, and 4, strong infinite horizon optimality criteria are introduced, which 
represent more accurately the “worth” of policies over long finite horizons. 
To simplify the exposition, attention is restricted to systems where the state 
space S is countable and the action space ;Z isJinite, though many of our results 
apply to more general situations. Our formulation of the Markovian decision 
model follows Blackwell [I, 21. Periodically, at times n = 1, 2,..., one observes 
the current state s E S and selects an action a E -4. The result is (i) an immediate 
income i(s, a) and (ii) a transition to a new state s’ with probability Q(S’ 1 s, a), 
(s’ E S). The incomes are assumed bounded. The problem is to control the 
system for a prescribed horizon length N, which may be finite or infinite. A 
decision rule or policy r specifies for each integer 1 ,( n < N what action to 
select in the nth period as a function of the system’s current history h == (sl , 
1 ,..., s,), or, more generally, n assigns to each h a probability distribution on -3. 
h nonrandomized) stationary policy is defined by a single function f mapping S 
into d: Under it, one selects action f (s) whenever the system is in state s. For 
any initial state s E S and any policy n, let rj(s, TIT) denote the expected income in 
jth period, j > 1. For finite LV, the expected A--stage return under r at s equals 
V’(s, r) = $, rj(s, r); then a policy rr* . IS said to be X-stage optimal if I7”‘(s, +) 
= s-C(s) = sup, V(s, n), (s E S). 
For infinite N, the expected total returns need not be well defined and finite, 
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and there are a number of competing optimality criteria. At one extreme, a 
policy Z-* is said to be overtaking optimal if 
i;f[limninf( P(s, 7r*) - Vi(7r, s))] = 0 @ES) (1) 
(see Denardo and Rothblum [5] and Gale [IO]). Unfortunately, as Denardo and 
Miller [4] noted, that criterion is often too restrictive to be useful. On the less 
sensitive side, a policy n* is said to be average optimal if 
i;f[limninf(Vn(s, n*) - rn(s, 77)) fz] = 0 @ES) (2) 
(see Flynn [8, p. 9371). That criterion is sometimes underselective, since it 
depends only on the tails of the returns. An alternative, due to Veinott [ 181, is to 
define a policy CT* to be average overtaking optimal if 
$f [limninf f  ( I’j(s, 57*) - vj(s, n))/n] = 0 (s E S). 
j=l 
Blackwell [I] uses criteria that depend on the discounted returns. For any n 
and any state s, the (infinite horizon) expected discounted returns from rr at s 
equals Va(s, r) = xF=, /3-lrj(s, r), w ere h 0 < /3 < 1 is the discount factor. 
A policy r* is said to be /3-optimal if VB(s, 7~*) = V:(s) 3 sup,, Va(s, n), (s E S). 
It is said to be l-optimal if 
i;f[lim,jnf (kg(s, x*) - Va(s, 7r))] = 0 (s E S). (4) 
Overtaking optimality always implies average optimality, average overtaking 
optimality, and 1-optimality. I f  S is finite, then average overtaking optimality, 
and I-optimality are equivalent, each implying average optimality (see [4, 8, 15, 
181). By [7, 81, one cannot say more without additional assumptions when S is 
countable. The next example illustrates that these infinite horizon criteria are 
sometimes irrelevant to long finite-horizon programs. It contains an overtaking 
optimal policy r,-, that becomes less and less desirable as the (finite) horizon 
length increases. 
EXAMPLE 1. Let S = (0, 1, 2 ,... > U {0’, l’, 2’, 3’,... } and let -12 = (0, 1, 2). 
When in state k (k = 1, 2, 3,...), one can either (action 0) move to state 0, or 
(action 1) move to k + 1, or (action 2) move to k’. Once in state k’ (k = 1, 2,...), 
the system moves to (k - l)‘, no matter what action is selected. Similarly, once 
in 0 or 0’, always there. The system earns 0 each time it occupies 0; -1 each 
time it enters 1 or 2 or 3 or “‘; -1 each time it occupies 0’; and 3 each time it 
enters 1’ or 2’ or 3’ or ... . The reader should verify that Vi”(l) = 2-W = 
V 2M-1(l) - l(M = 1, 2, 3,...) and that the policy r0 of always selecting 0 is 
overtaking optimal. Since V:(l) - VN(l, ~~0) 7 03, the overtaking optimal policy 
r0 becomes progressively less desirable as N increases. 
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2. THE AVERAGING CRITERION 
Given our interest in long finite horizons, it is natural to define a policy Z-* 
to be strong average optimal if 
liF( V(s, z-*) - V$(s))l;n = 0 (s E S). (5) 
Remark 1. One gets (5) by substituting V;(s) for P(s, r) in (2). The limit 
in (5) exists, since LTn(s, Z-*) - V:(s) < 0 (s E S). 
Strong average optimality implies average optimality. Using (2) and (5) 
one can show that the converse holds whenever there exists a strong average 
optimal policy. The following theorem follows from the arguments for [8, 
Theorem 21 (for related results, see Hordijk et al. [13]). Note that its require- 
ments are met by many models in the Markovian decision process literature. 
The averaging case is better behaved than the sensitive cases, which are 
studied later. 
THEOREM 1. In each of the following cases, there exists a stationary policy CT*, 
that is strong average optimal. Furthermore, one can choose Z-* so that V:(s) - 
P(s, n*) is bounded uniformly in n and s. 
(i) S is $nite. 
(ii) There exists a g E R1 and a bounded function f: S-t Ii1 such that 
(6) 
In this case any stationary policy which, for each s, selects the action maximizing 
the right-hand side of (6) suffices. 
(iii) Vz(s’) - V$(s”) is bounded uniformly in /3, s’, and s”. 
(iv) There exists a family, {&, 0 < p < I}, of &optimal stationary policies 
and a state s,, with the property: Under the Markov chain associated with any &, 
the system eventually reaches s, with probability 1; moreover, the mean recurrence 
time from s E S to s,, under TP is bounded uniformly in p and s. 
3. SENSITIVE CRITERIA 
Continuing with the approach of Section 2, define a policy r* to be strong 
overtaking optimal if 
liF(Vn(s, 7~*) - V:(s)) = 0 (s E S). (7) 
Similarly, a policy r* is said to be strong l-optimal if 
lim(Fa(s, 7r*) - T’:(s)) = 0 
E-l- (s E S). (8) 
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Remark 2. One gets (7) after substituting VJJs) for Vn(s, rr) in (I) (see 
Remark 1). Observe that (7) also results if one makes the same substitution into 
(3), so the strong version of average overtaking optimality reduces to strong 
overtaking optimality. 
Again, one can show that the strong and usual versions of optimality are 
equivalent whenever a policy satisfying the strong version exists. Of course, 
strong overtaking optimality implies strong average optimality. As in [8], one 
can argue that strong I-optimality implies strong average optimality, provided 
that a strong average optimal policy exists. By the next lemma, strong overtaking 
optimality implies strong l-optimality. 
LEMMA 1. For any policy T and any s E S, 
l$nsup( V:(s) - VB(s, n)) < limzup( V”,(s) - Vn(s, n)). (9) 
Proof. Fix s and x. Let K equal the right-hand side of (9) and let a, J 0 
satisfy, V:(s) - P(s, r) < K + an(n > 1). For any policy 0 and 0 < /3 < 1, 
f  (1 - p) i p-‘( Vj(j(s, 0) - Vj(s, r)) < (1 - p) 2 Bj-l(K + aj) 
j=l j=l 
=K+(l -j3)f8’-‘aj. 
j=l 
Inequality (9) follows, since 8 is arbitrary and a, JO. 
Remark 3. One can show that any rr and s must satisfy, V:(s) - Vn(s, T) < 
lim s~pe+~-(V~(s) - Ve(s, r)) + lim infs+r-[sups,,,.,(VB*(s’) - V,*(s”))], n > 1. 
Strong overtaking optimal policies exist only under restrictive conditions. 
Example 2 below satisfies the conditions of [5] (for overtaking optimality), yet 
no strong overtaking optimal policy exists. 
EXAMPLE 2. Let S = A = (0, I}. I n either state, one can either move to 
state 0 (action 0), or move to state 1 (action 1). Let ~(0, 0) = -5, ~(1, 1) = 1, 
i(0, 1) = -10, and ~(1, 0) = 5. By routine calculations, V:(O) = -5, V:(O) = 
-7 + n, for n 3 2, and V,“(l) = 4 + n, for n > 1. It is easy to see that the 
policy r* of always selecting action 1 is the unique overtaking optimal policy and 
satisfies the requirements of [5, Corollary 21. Since V”(O, z-*) = - 11 + n and 
Vn(l, T*) = 71, for n > 1, r* is not strong overtaking optimal. 
Regarding strong I-optimality, [l, Theorem 51 establishes existence for 
finite S; however, for countable S, such policies need not exist-and they need 
not even be applicable to finite horizons when they do exist: An example appears 
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in Flynn [7], where a strong l-optimal policy n* and an s,, E S satisfy 
lim sup,( VG(sO) - P(s,, , n*)) = cc (that policy also fails to be average 
optimal). Alternative criteria are explored below. 
4. THE OPPORTUNITY COST 
One can think of V!Js) - Vn(s, n) as th e “opportunity cost” of using 77 in an 
n-stage program when the initial state is s. Following Flynn [9], define the 
opportunity cost of the policy rr at s by 
O(n, s) = lim;up(Vz(s) - V”(s, n)) (s E S). (10) 
If  O(V, .) is finite valued, then n is said to have$nite opportunity cost. Of course, 
if CT has finite opportunity cost, then v  is strong average optimal (the converse 
fails). Define 
P(s) = ivf O(0, s) (s E S). (11) 
The finiteness of P is equivalent to the existence of a policy with finite oppor- 
tunity cost. Note that the hypotheses of Theorem 1 imply the latter. 
The quantity O(r, s) contains information about the “worth” of rr in a long- 
horizon program with initial state s. According to (IO), it provides a tight, 
asymptotic upper bound on the feasible improvements in the undiscounted 
returns for large finite N, i.e., it is the smallest number with the property: For 
E > 0, the available increases in Va”(s, .rr) are bounded by [O(rr, s) + c], given 
that N is sufficiently large. One can interpret it as the “greatest improvement 
possible” when the limit in (10) exists. For infinite N, O(z-, s) tends to over- 
estimate the improvements that can be made, i.e., sup8 lim sup,( V”(s, 6) - 
P(s, r)) < O(r, s), (s E S), with the inequality usually being strict. One reason 
is that some improvements are available only when the horizon is finite, e.g., 
switching to an M-stage optimal policy in the last M stages, where M Q N. 
For models in which returns are discounted at “small interest rates,” i.e., 
where the discount factor 0 < j3 <I is near 1, the opportunity cost bounds the 
increases in the total discounted returns (see Lemma 1 above): Unlike a policy 
that is optimal for a specific /3, a policy with finite opportunity cost has a “worth” 
that is insensitive to 0 < /3 < 1 for ,6 near 1 (difficulties arise for /3 > 1: see 
Dirickx [6]). Note that the use of “lim sup” in (10) is essential here: There are 
examples where limB+i-( V$(s,) - Va(s,, , r)) > lim infn( l?Js,,) - V(sO , .rr)), for 
an s0 E S and some rr. 
For finite N, the current action in an N-stage optimal policy may depend both 
on the current history h and on the number of stages till termination. One can 
think of P(s) as the penalty associated with ignoring the finiteness of ,V and 
blindly choosing actions that depend only on h when the initial state is s, i.e., 
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of using an infinite horizon approximation when I\T is finite. Note that generally 
P(s) does not merely represent the effect of using a stationary policy at s (see the 
countable state and countable action model in Strauch [17, Example 6-j). The 
following lemma relates P and 0: 
LEMMA 2. For any s E S and any policies m and 0, 
lim inf[V”(s, e) - P(s, fl)] < O(57, S) - o(e, S) < lim sup[ F?~(s, e) - V(S, TT)]. ?I n 
(12) 
Consequently, O(T, s) - P(s) is bounded below by sups lim inf,[ P(s, 0) - 
V(s, TT)] 3 0, and bounded above by sups lim sup,[Vn(s, 0) - P(s, ?r)]. 
Proof It is enough to establish (12). Fix s and Z-. For any 0, 
O(TT, S) = lim s~p,[(V;(s) - P(s, e)) + (P(s, e) - P(s, 7~>)] < o(e, S) + 
lim sup,[P(s, 0) - Vn(s, T)], giving us the right-hand side of (12). The left- 
hand-side follows similarly. 
The next result follows easily from the previous lemma. 
COROLLARY 1. If  T is overtaking optimal, then O(r, s) = P(s) (s E S). I f  
O(n, s) = P(s) (s E S), then inf, lim supJP(s, r) - Vn(s, e)] = 0 (s E S). 
The converses of both parts of that corollary may fail. Also, as Example 3 
below illustrates, the class of l-optimal policies need not contain a policy 
minimizing the opportunity cost, even when such a policy exists. Because of this, 
establishing conditions for the existence of such policies may not be that easy. 
Note that the objective in [9] is to find policies for which the opportunity cost is 
“reasonably small,” not policies where it is a minimum. 
EXAMPLE 3. Let S = (0, 1, l’, 2, 3, 3’) and let il = { 1, 2, 3). In state 0, one 
can either (action 1) move to 1 and earn -1, or (action 2) move to 2 and earn 
- ;f, or (action 3) move to 3 and earn 1. In other states, the transitions and 
incomes are independent of the actions. From state 1, the system moves to 
state I’ and earns 2; from 1’ to 1, earning -2; from 3 to 3’, earning-2; from 
3’ to 3, earning 2; and from 2, it returns to 2 and gets 0. Let nj be a policy that 
selects i in state 0, j = 1, 2, 3. It is easy to see that (i) ~-a is p-optimal for all /3, 
(ii) r1 and ~a are l-optimal and fail to minimize the opportunity cost, and (iii) ~a 
does minimize the opportunity cost, but is not l-optimal. 
One can ameliorate some of the difficulties mentioned in the previous para- 
graph by introducing an alternative definition of opportunity cost that bears 
the same relationship to average overtaking optimality that the original definition 
does to overtaking optimality. For any policy n, let 
01(7r, s) = limzup f  (Vi(s) - V(s, -rr))/n 
j=I 
(s E S). (13) 
409!76/1-14 
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Of course , 0 < O,(~T, S) < 0(7f, S) (S E S), with equality holding whenever the 
limit in (10) exists. Note that O(?T, S) can be infinite when O,(rr, S) is finite. One 
can establish analogues of our current results in which 0, plays the role of 0, 
e.g., if r is averagz overtaking optimal, then O1(r, S) = inf, 0,(0, S) (S E S). 
The details are left to the reader. 
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